Archive for February, 2009

Still More on State Secrets

February 17, 2009

The Bush Administration has been widely criticized for its assertion of the state secrets privilege to prevent litigation that would otherwise subject some of its most notorious executive actions to judicial review.  Whenever suits have been brought to challenge aspects of its warrantless surveillance program or its program of extraordinary renditions, the Justice Department has interposed the objection that the suit cannot proceed because doing so poses a “reasonable danger” of exposing “matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”  That is how the Supreme Court put the relevant question in the seminal state secrets case, United States v. Reynolds.  The privilege can be waived by the executive branch, but once it has been asserted and the court has been persuaded that disclosure poses a danger to the national security, no amount of urgency or necessity on the other side can outweigh it.  So the privileged information gets excluded from the litigation.  The plaintiff can attempt to proceed on the basis of non privileged information, but if the privileged information is so important to the plaintiff’s case that he cannot prove his case without it – or if it is so central to a defense that might be offered – the case gets dismissed.  This is just what happened in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, the case that was argued before the Ninth Circuit court of appeals last week.  Mohamed and five other plaintiffs had been seized by American personnel, forcibly taken to nearby airports, stripped, dressed in diapers and jumpsuits, blindfolded and shackled to the floor of a Gulfstream V  — apparently the same Gulfstream V in each case.  That Gulfstream V, jokingly referred to by a Jeppesen employee as the “torture plane,” provided material assistance in an operation that subjected each plaintiff to harsh incarceration and torture in a destination country, and it was on the basis of that knowing assistance that the plaintiffs sued Jeppesen Dataplan.  At least, these are the allegations.   In this suit for damages, neither Jeppesen nor the United States has ever answered the allegations because the United States succeeded in having the case dismissed by the district court, on the ground that the case could not be litigated without disclosing state secrets.   

It is clear that progressives believe that the Bush administration has been abusing the state secrets privilege to avoid accountability and hide embarrassing facts.  Oral argument in Jeppesen, on February 3, was to provide an early signal on just how much change to expect from the Obama Justice Department.   But the government’s lawyer told the panel that the administration was not changing its position at all in the case, and was still urging the appeals court to affirm the district court.   In the midst of the disappointment, it is fair to ask the question:  just what should progressives have been expecting?

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More on State Secrets

February 16, 2009

Last week, the Obama Justice Department made news by virtue of what it did not do: In oral argument in a case before the Ninth Circuit, the Justice Department took the same position on a question of state secrets, arguing for complete dismissal of the case, just as the Bush Justice Department had done. The New York Times covered the story here. The Obama folks might reasonably be cut some slack here; because the key political appointees who should and will be involved in any reconsideration of the government’s policy toward state secrets are not yet fully in place it might have been expected that the government would not yet be ready to announce a major switch in position so soon after January 20.

That said, what is it reasonable to expect from them, once they have had the chance for that thorough review?  The state secrets doctrine prevents the use in litigation of evidence that would reveal information that would damage the interests of the government.  Originally a concept broader than military and national security secrets, the doctrine in recent years has arisen most often in the context of cases where those types of secrets have been involved.  The doctrine can be invoked by the executive branch to prevent disclosure in court of documents and evidence that would reveal state secrets.  If the court accepts the executive branch’s argument, the result is to preclude the use of such evidence.  At a minimum, application of the doctrine will preclude the use of some evidence in court and at the maximum, if that preclusion makes it impossible for the plaintiff to prove his or her case or for the defendant to present a defense, the result can be dismissal of the case.  The Bush Administration has been accused of applying the doctrine with “offhanded abandon.”  However, a careful review of state secrets cases by Bobby Chesney, in an article for the George Washington Law Review, convincingly demonstrates that Bush administration use of the doctrine does not differ significantly from past administrations.  The number of times it has been invoked – which have been on the rise – is probably attributable to a rise in the number of lawsuits filed during the Bush administration that challenge programs or operations that the administration argues need to be kept secret.  The rise in invoking the doctrine, in other words, emanates from the secretive nature of the Bush administration, not from any attempt to pervert the traditional doctrine or to apply it in novel circumstances.

But the relationship between the state secrets doctrine and the lack of transparency of our government is precisely the point that has caused people to take notice of the Obama administration’s failure to tack off in a different direction in the Ninth Circuit.  President Obama has promised a more transparent government.  Shouldn’t one manifestation of that change be a change in the attempts made by the administration to prevent disclosure through the use of the state secrets doctrine?  That depends.  On the campaign trail, the Obama people might have thought the same thing  that many other people thought:  that the Bush administration was misusing the doctrine in the sense of applying it inappropriately to cases where a good faith application of the doctrine would not have applied it.  Once having the opportunity to examine specific cases, however, the Obama people might conclude that genuine state secrets are at stake in these cases and that there is a legitimate reason to seek application of the state secrets doctrine in them.  Of course, nothing compels the executive branch to assert the doctrine even in warranted cases, and it might conclude that the interests in transparency and the opportunity of an injured person to have a day in court outweighed the significance of preserving the secret.  If that is what we are expecting, it is even more understandable that the incoming administration needs some more time, because a number of agencies and individuals in government, extending well beyond the Justice Department, would have equities in a decision to waive an otherwise valid legal defense. They would need to be consulted before such a decision could be made.

If, on the other hand, expectations were that the Obama Administration would change its position specifically in the case in the Ninth Circuit because it was legally erroneous to apply the state secrets doctrine to that case – the position that the ACLU takes in the case – then that is a different matter.  Sizing up that expectation requires an examination of the particular facts of the Ninth Circuit case, and that is the topic for tomorrow’s post.

Revisiting the Torture Memos

February 14, 2009

Some of the most aggressive positions on executive authority taken during the Bush Administration are those found in the infamous “Torture Memo.”  We now know that this memo, dated August 1, 2002, provided the legal underpinnings for aggressive interrogation practices, including waterboarding, of a number of detainees.  After a series of questionable interpretations of statutory law, the memo concludes that the president as commander-in-chief can sanction practices that violate the Convention Against Torture as well as US statutory law prohibiting torture.  When this memo was leaked to the press, the Bush Administration withdrew it, but not before the legal damage had been done.  The role of Office of Legal Counsel lawyers, the Vice President’s office, and others, have been the subject of numerous congressional hearings, including a series of five focused on them held by the House Judiciary Committee during the 110th Congress. 

President Obama has repudiated interrogation practices that the Torture Memo held to be legally permissible, and his expressed preference for moving forward rather than engaging in recriminations argues for closing the door on this chapter in the war on terror.  Nonetheless, a question lurking in the controversy over the Bush Administration’s interrogation policies has been whether the legal authorization of these practices justified disciplinary or other action against the lawyers who drafted these memos.  Now, Mike Isikoff of Newsweek is reporting that the Office of Professional Responsibility has written a draft report critical of the performance of OLC lawyers in drafting the memo.  This report, which was circulated to Attorney General Mukasey sometime prior to his leaving office, looks like it will land on Attorney General Eric Holder’s desk.  When it does, it will force the Department of Justice to confront an uncomfortable question:  was the legal analysis deliberately shaped to provide legal cover for aggressive interrogation practices?  If the evidence suggests that possibility, it will become more difficult to defend the Torture Memo as a misguided, yet good faith, interpretation of the law – and the chapter door will have to remain open a little longer.

Secret Law

February 13, 2009

As we have noted, in the final weeks of the Bush Administration the Office of Legal Counsel released a number of opinions, both memoranda and letters, that had not previously been publicly disclosed, although some had been shared with the Congress.  Propublica and the ACLU are both monitoring a rather long list of as-yet-undisclosed memos.

The recent disclosures have not entirely satisfied some members of Congress.  Representative Brad Miller (D-NC) has introduced H. 278, “The OLC Reporting Act of 2009.”  The bill, which is substantively the same as S3501 introduced by Senator Feingold in the 110th Congress, would require the Attorney General to notify Congress anytime DOJ issued an “authoritative interpretation” of a statute that concluded it was unconstitutional in any particular application; that employed the canon of interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional concerns for reasons of separation of powers or intruding into the President’s powers; that relied upon a legal presumption against applying it to any actors in or actions of the executive branch; or that concluded part of the statute had been superseded by implication by a later enacted statute.

Each of these techniques of legal interpretation figured prominently in the legal analysis of significant opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel during the Bush Administration.  They each have the result of changing the effective coverage of a piece of legislation enacted by the Congress.  A dramatic example:  in the White Paper the Department of Justice released to explain why the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act did not prevent the President from authorizing warrantless surveillance, the Justice Department relied in part on the argument that the FISA had been impliedly repealed by the Authorization on the Use of Military Force.  This was a particularly weak argument – it stretched the doctrine of implied repeal quite far – but the relevant point here is that had Congress known about this interpretation and thought it wrong, it could have enacted language making clear that it intended no implied repeal when it enacted the AUMF.  But it did not know, and may never have known except that the New York Times story exposed the NSA program, and that compelled the administration to issue the White Paper defending it.  Congress cannot exercise its governance responsibilities in regards to a problem if they don’t know the problem exists.  The Reporting Act is aimed at surfacing similar legal interpretations in the future.

In one of the recently released OLC opinions, the Office of Legal Counsel concludes that the 2008 version of the OLC Reporting Act is unconstitutional.  Stay tuned for more discussion of this – and watch for questioning about it at Dawn Johnsen’s confirmation hearings as incoming head of OLC.  She helped write the Reporting Act.

 

 

Holder Hearings – Part II

February 11, 2009

An earlier post observed that pinning down the views of any lawyer in the Executive Branch on the scope of the president’s authority to override or disregard statutes can be extremely difficult.  Individuals being questioned about the limits of the president’s constitutional authority quite often respond with a statement of policy.  Even when the answer does speak to constitutional authority it often contains weasel words:  it is hard for any president’s lawyer voluntarily to take the idea that actions taken contrary to law could be lawful in extreme circumstances entirely off the table.  But then the effective limitation of the president’s powers depends on who is defining “extreme.” The earlier post provided examples from Eric Holder’s confirmation hearings of answers that might have soothed the worries of questioning Senators but actually failed to limit the President’s authority very much.  There were two exchanges, however, one with Senator Leahy and the other with Senator Hatch, in which Mr. Holder went beyond policy statements and avoided weasel words — one regarding authorization of torture and the other the use of warrantless intelligence surveillance.  Here they are:  (more…)

SCOTUS Watch: Avoiding Judicial Abdication to Expansive Executive Power in Ashcroft v. Iqbal

February 10, 2009

Duke Law Student Jason Rathod discusses the importance of judicial checks on the executive branch in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.

Sometimes courts are asked to define the scope of executive authority by defining its “hard” boundaries, answering questions such as whether the president’s commander-in-chief authority extends to determining the interrogation techniques that can be used on detainees.  Equally important, sometimes the effective scope of executive authority is also determined by how courts establish its “soft” boundaries, by deciding whether executive branch officials can properly be sued to test whether a hard boundary has been exceeded or not.  The doctrine of immunity from suit plays an important role in determining whether judicial review is available for contestable executive action.  On December 10, 2008 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case testing the limits of executive immunity from suit. (more…)

No Change in State Secrets …. Yet

February 10, 2009

Five men who claim to have been seized by United States personnel and then flown to CIA “black sites” are suing a Boeing subsidiary for its participation in these actions – “extraordinary renditions” in the parlance of the war on terror.  The United States intervened in the case, claiming that it must be thrown out of court because allowing it to proceed violates the state secrets doctrine.  The federal district court judge agreed with the government and the plaintiffs appealed, hoping for a different result in the Ninth Circuit court of appeals. 

As important, with President Obama’s emphasis on transparency and accountability, the plaintiffs were anticipating a change in the government’s position.   But when Doug Letter, a seasoned career DOJ appellate lawyer, stood up before the Ninth Circuit panel yesterday, he announced that the government’s position remained the same.  The New York Times story is here

Many observers are convinced that the Bush Administration misused the state secrets doctrine to prevent judicial inquiry into matters whose examination would pose little or no threat to national security.  As Senator Kennedy has said, “If the privilege is not applied carefully, the government can use it as a tool for cover-up, by withholding evidence that is not actually sensitive. The state secrets privilege is important, but there’s a risk it will be overused and abused.”  If that is what the Bush Administration has been doing in any particular case, the Obama Administration does indeed need to change.  From this perspective, the decision to stick to the old position in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan is unsettling.

 That said, it is much too early to draw any large conclusions from this single incident.  The Justice Department is an inherently conservative organization – not in the sense of conservative versus liberal, but in the sense of being slow to make significant changes of position rapidly.  That characteristic has many benefits in terms of following the rule of law and treating like cases alike.  As frustrating as it is for those who have waited eight years for better management of our Justice Department, the Department does need the benefit of additional time to reconsider its approach to state secrets.  Although Eric Holder has been confirmed by the Senate, the heads of the National Security Division, the Office of Legal Counsel, the Solicitor General and the Deputy Attorney General are all awaiting confirmation – until these key DOJ leaders are in place, the full scale deliberations and review that ought to precede sound and sober decision making cannot take place.  They ought to be expeditious, however.  The use of state secrets doctrine to block law suits has become a major litigating tactic and Senator Kennedy’s worry that it can be misused is justified.  The Ninth Circuit action may prompt the reintroduction of Senator Kennedy’s State Secrets Protection Act, which provides judges additional tools to scrutinize and control excessive uses of the doctrine.

Lingering Issues of Executive Privilege – Part I

February 9, 2009

As the Bush Administration prepared to leave office, its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) publicly released a number of opinions written during the Bush Presidency. Some of these were written years ago, some much more recently, and some had been transmitted to the Congress, but not yet published. While this public release is surely welcome, it still leaves a large body of undisclosed legal opinions from the outgoing administration. Propublica and the ACLU are both monitoring a rather long list of as-yet-undisclosed memos, most of which are subjects of outstanding oversight requests from both the Senate and the House. Not all of these opinions address questions of executive authority; OLC writes opinions on matters of constitutional law, statutory and regulatory interpretation that do not implicate executive authority. But in its role as the “president’s law firm,” OLC regularly advises the President and others in the executive branch on matters of executive authority.

Several of the OLC memos that do concern executive authority also deal with matters that have some immediate on going significance, because they deal with responses to congressional requests for information that may be renewed in the 111th Congress. When and if they are, we will have a chance to compare directly the views of the Obama Administration to those of the Bush Administration. One of the recently released memos deals with the Valerie Plame affair. (more…)

The Incredibly Slippery Idea of Executive Authority

February 7, 2009

The Holder Hearings — Part I

The recently departed Bush Administration took a notoriously broad and aggressive view of presidential or executive authority.  President Bush and his lawyers thought that the President can disregard statutory prohibitions if they interfere with the President’s opinion of what actions would serve the national defense.  So Congress has passed laws making surveillance authorized by warrants from a federal court the only way to eavesdrop on terrorist conversations inside the United States, but the President thinks the warrant procedures are too restrictive?  No problem – the President can ignore the statute, because the Constitution makes him the commander-in-chief and gives him the authority to perform that job effectively.  The argument is laid out on pages 28 to 36 of a White Paper issued by the Department of Justice shortly after the New York Times ran a story revealing the secret warrantless surveillance program that the National Security Agency had been running after September 11.  This authority of the President to override statutes showed up in many of the signing statements that President Bush issued concurrently with signing pieces of legislation, infuriating members of Congress and often leaving people in the dark about when the President would follow the law or choose to disregard it.

There is now a great expectation that the incoming Obama Administration will take a noticeably different view of presidential authority.  During the presidential campaign he signaled that he intends to obey the Constitution and the rule of law.   And already he has begun rolling back some of the more controversial actions President Bush took as commander-in-chief, notably including, President Obama issued an executive order to roll back controversial commander-in-chief actions of President Bush, notably including ordering a stop to the military commission trials of Guantanamo detainees so that the people being held there can each be evaluated individually to decide whether a trail should proceed in a regular federal court or a regular military court martial.

It would be startling if there was not a significant shift on questions of presidential authority under President Obama – but at the same time one ought to be cautious in drawing firm conclusions regarding exactly where the Administration now stands on each of the many different aspects of executive authority.  While it is often the case that actions speak louder than words, executive authority is situation in which actions can be ambiguous and words incredibly slippery.  An action like closing down military commissions could mean that the President thinks he lacks the unilateral authority to create them or it could mean he has decided not to use military commissions because of how they have damaged our international reputation, even though he thinks he has the unilateral authority to use them if he wished.  Decisions not to exercise authority always are ambivalent in this way, because failures to act are equally consistent with someone lacking the authority to act and also with someone having the authority and just declining to exercise it.  (With respect to the military commissions themselves, of course, this question has become moot because five years after President Bush established them unilaterally, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act giving them a statutory foundation.)     (more…)


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